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THE WELFARE STATE AND
COMPETITIVENESS
ABSTRACT
Inallmodern industrial countries, redistributive expenditures are a larger component of
the governmentbudget than consumption of goods andservices.In thispaper,we usea general
equilibrium, two-country model with exportables, importables and nontraclables to study
redistribution across different types of agents in a world characterized by the presence of labor
unions and distortionary taxation. We show that an increase in transfers to, say, retirees, financed
by distortionary taxation, can generate a loss of competitiveness (defined as an increase in
relative unit labor costs for tradable goods), an appreciation of the relative price of nontradables,
and a decrease in employment in all sectors of the domestic economy. The same qualitative
effectswould also obtain in the caseof an increase in transfers towards the unemployed even if
financedby non-distortionarytaxation. Moreover, all these effects of labor taxationdependin
anonlinear way on the degreeof centralization of thewage settingprocessin thelabormarket.
Wethenestimatethe effects of labor taxation on unitlaborcostsand the relative price of
nontradables in a sample of 14 OECD countries. We fmdconsiderable empiricalsupport for the
model.
Alberto Alesina Roberto Perotti
Department of Economics Department ofEconomics
Harvard University Columbia University
Cambridge,MA 02138 420W. 118 St., 10th floor
and NEER New York, NY 100271 Introduction.
Fiscal policy in industrialized countries is largely about redistribution. Table I shows that
intheEuropean Community the share of government outlays which can be classified as
redistributive was less than government purchases of goods and services in 1960, but it
wassignificantlylarger in 1988. i.'deed, policymakers struggling with fiscal reforms in
OECD countries have to deal primarily with redistributive issues, both within and across
generations.
What are the costs of redistribution? A common view in Europe is that the burden of
the "welfare state" causes losses of competitiveness.The use and meaning of the word
"competitiveness" have recently been questioned on several grounds. Because we define
this word without any ambiguity as relative unit labor costs (or, equivalently, as relative
price of imports), we feel free to continue to use it despite its academic unpopularity.
Moreover, regardless of how they are expressed, the widespMad concernsaboutthe effects of
redistributive expenditure and of distortionary taxation should not be dismissed too lightly.
Despite this, fiscal policy in existing international macro models is concerned mainly with
the role of government consumption financed by lump-sum taxation or deficits. For
example, in the Handbook of International Economics we could not find a single mention
of any other type of fiscal policy.
In this paper we study theoretically and empirically the effects on competitiveness of
redistribution financed by distortionary taxation. In order to study this issue we use a
two-country model with three main characteristics. First, since we study redistribution,
we need to abandon the representative agent world. Thus, we consider a model with three
typesofagents: employers and workers (some of whom can be unemployed in equilibrium),
whotogetherformtheproductive sector of the economy,anda sector of unproductive
individuals, whom we call retirees. We consider redistribution from the productive to the
unproductive sector as well as within the productive sector from employed to unemployed
For instance,the recent coveragesof the Financial Times and the New York Times onEuropean welfare
systemshave strongly emphasized this point.
'Among the contributions that constitute an exception to this statement, see especially Fenkel and
Razin (1987) for a general theoretical u 'atment of inter-generational redistribution and distortionary
taxation in open economies.Table 1: Government purchases of goods and services and
social expenditure in the EEC, as shares of GDP.
soc. exp. govt. cons. soc. exp.govt. cons.
1960 1960 1988 1988
Belgium 12.3 12.4 27.7 15.2
Denmark 11.1 13.3 29.3 12.57
France 11.7 14.2 28.1 18.5
Germany 13.5 13.4 28.3 19.7
Ireland 10.4(t) 22.4 12.5 16.4
Italy 10.6 12.0 23.1 16.9
Luxembourg 13.1 9.8 26.2 16.3
Portugal 5.5 10.5 17.0 16.0
Spain 4.0 8.3 17.2 14.8
United Kingdom 10.9 16,4 22.1 19.7
average 10.4 12.3 24.7 17.7
(*):1966.Sources:EUROSTAT(social expenditure) andOECD(government con-
sumption). Social expenditure includes the following types of benefits: sickness;
invalidity/disability;employment injury; old age; survivors; maternity; family; un-
employment; vocational training; housing.
2members of the labor force, both hotly debated issues in many OECD countries.
Second, we consider unionized labor markets. In the presence, of unions both types
of redistributions we analyze (to unemployed workers and to retirees) have important ef-
fects on the cost side of firms because of the use of distortionary taxation to finance the
government budget: taxes on labor (income, social security or payroll taxes) affect labor
costs and therefore profitability and competitiveness, to the extent that they are not borne
entirely by workers. This point is hardly new, but it has received much more attention in
policy debates than in academic contributions. In fact, under a common set of assumptions
in the literature, i.e. competitive labor markets with inelastic individual labor supplies,
these taxes would be completely borne by workers and would have no aggregate effects.
By contrast, in the presence of unions the burden of labor taxation will be borne in part
by employers and will therefore increase labor ccsts even if the individual labor supply is
perfectly inelastic.
The third feature of our model is that we consider differentiated goods produced by
monopolistically competitive firms. With differentiated goods, we can have different sectors
in the economy. This allows us to study how different types of labor markets influence the
effects of fiscal policy. The characteristic of labor markets we focus on is their degree of
centralization, defined as the inverse of the number of unions inthe economy: in more
centralized labor markets, workers are represented by fewer unions, each encompassing
more sectors. The degree of centralization is an important determinant of the effects of
fiscal policy because large unions can better internalize the negative employment effects of
their wage demands, but they also have more monopoly power. Thus, how much wages
increase in response to an increase in labor taxation depends on the degree of centralization
of labor markets.
The basic idea of the paper is as follows. An increase in, say, income taxes used to
finance redistribution to retirees and/or unemployed workers induces the labor unions to
increase wa.ge pressure. This effect is magnified if the redistribution to the unemployed
increases the union's reservation wage. The increased wage pressure is reflected in higher
output prices and therefore induces a loss of competitiveness (the relative price of imports
to exports). In turn, the loss of competitiveness causes a reduction in the demand for
3exports and a fall in employment in the exportable sector. The same chain of events -
fromhigher wages to higher prices and lower employment -leadsto a fall in employment
in the nontradable sector. In fact, the price of nontradables increases even more than that
of tradables because the former do not face any foreign competition.
We atso show that the distortions caused by fiscal policy are a non-linear function of
the degree of centralization of labor markets. Intuitively, as the degree of centralization
increases and the typicat union becomes larger, the monopoly power of each union increases
and fiscal policy becomes increasingly distortionary. At some point, however, the unions
will become targe enough to internalize the negative repercussion effects on demand and
employment of an increase in the wage via the current account equilibrium condition. This
will induce the union to moderate its wage claims, and the mOre so the larger it is. Thus, as
the degree of centralization increases, the distortionary effects of fiscal policy first increase,
then decrease.
The empirical part of the paper tests several of these implications by considering the
effects of labor taxation on competitiveness and the relative price of nontradables. In a
panel of 14 countries for the period 1960-1990, we find that the results are supportive of our
theory. For instance, we find that, when taxes on labor increase by 1% of GDP, unit labor
costs in countries with an intermediate level of centralization increase byup to 3% relative
to competitors. Labor taxation also has significant negative effects on profit margins and
positive effects on the relative price of nontradables. Furthermore, the effects of taxation
are indeed a hump-shaped function of the degree of centralization, peaking in countries
with an intermediate level of centralization. All these resultsappear to be quite robust,
and the values ol the coefficients on the tax variables are generallyvery stable.
Our paper is related to three quite different strands of research. In internationalmacroe-
conomics, the study of the effects of fiscal policy in open economies has typically focused
on the role of government purchases of goods and services and on its effects on the relative
price of nontradables. An extension of the Balassa (1964) model to include the government
sector shows that an increase in government spending on goods and services, falling more
heavily on labor-intensive nontradable goods, leads to an appreciation of the relative price
of nontradables via an increase in the demand for labor. Recent researchby Froot and
4Rogoff (1991), De Gregorio, Giov&nini and Krueger (1993) and De Gregorio, Ciovannini
and W0lf (1993) finds, to different degrees, empirical support for this theory.
At the intersection of public finance and labor economics, several contributions have
looked at the effects of taxation on wages and costs, particularly in closed economies. Ex-
amples of these contributions are Knoester and van der Windt (1987) and Padoa-Schioppa
(1990). The tatter, in particular, is an antecedent to our approach in that it studies the
role of Labor unions in the shifting of the burden of taxation. Au earlier and more general
reference for an analysis of this class of problems is Bruno and Saclis (1985).
Finally, our paper is related to the large literature on corporatism, unionization and
macroeconomic performance. Calmfors and DrifIll (1988) and Freeman (1988) present
empirical evidence on the existence of a hump-shaped relation between the degree of cen-
tralization in labor markets and unemployment. A large theoretical body of literature has
put forward various explanations for this relationship: among others, Caimfors and Drifill
(1988), 1-{oel (1991) and Holden and Raaum (1992) are somehow related to our explanation,
which, to our knowledge, remains novel in its emphasis on the effects of the external con-
straint on the behavior of unions. The list above is far from complete, however: Calmfors
(1993) provides an exhaustive survey of the literature on the topic. The closest antecedent
to our paper is probably Summers, Gruber and Vergara (1993), who study the relation-
ship between the degree of centralization in labor markets and the effects of distortionary
taxation on labor supply decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents
the main results for the case of two unions in the economy, one per sector. Section 4 shows
how the results vary with the number of unions in the economy. In these two sections, we
only provide the main intuitions for our results and sketch the solution of the model. A
more detailed exposition of the results and all the proofs are in the Appendix. The reader
mostly interested in the theory should read this Appendix, which instead can be skipped
by the reader mostly intersted in the empirical results. Section 5 presents our empirical
results. The last section concludes.
52 The model.
2.1 The structure of the economy.
We consider a world composed of two countries that produce traded and non traded goods.
In each country, the tradable sector is composed of a total mass I of firms, each producing
a differentiated good with a constant returns to scale technology, y(i) =n(i),where i refers
to the z-th firm and n(i) is employment in the i-tb firm in the tradable sector. Similarly,
the nontradable sector is composed of a mass 1 of firms, each producing a differentiated
good with the same technology: u(i) =h(i),where a ""indicatesa non traded good.
We assume, for simplicity, that there are no fixed costs in production. Thus, if we
allowed for free entry, the equilibrium number of firms would be indeterminate in this
model. Since these issues are not the focus of this paper, we assume that in both countries
there is a fixed number of firms each producing a different good.
Individuals in the home country have the following homothetic preferences over con-
sumption of tradable and nontradable goods (see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)):
U =
(JO'O(i)fdi)(J0' C(i)+di+ L'(i)+di)t+ i —6)R,A> 0 (1)
in this expression, C(i) denotes consumption of the i-th domestic variety of non traded
goods, C(i) denotes consumption of the i-tb domestic variety of traded goods ("exporta-
bles" from now on) and a *denotesa foreign variable, so that C(i) is consumption of
the z-th foreign variety of traded goods ("importabl&). A is related to the elasticity of
substitution between two varieties of traded or non traded goods,a, through the formula
= —1).11 is the utility of ISure, and S is an indicator variable that takes the value
of 11! the individual works ando if he does not work. A symmetricexpression holds for
the utility function of an individual in the foreigncountry.
According to this utility function, each individual allocates half of his income to the
consumption of non traded goods and half to the consumption of traded goods. How much
of this second half is devoted to the consumption of exportables dependson their price
relative to importables.
We will discusstheseissues later in section 5, where we allow for fixed costs of production.
6From the utility function (I) one can derive a dual expression for the price index of
nontradables 1',andtradables, P (see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)):
= [A'fi(O'°di};= {J'p(i)'di+ A'°'']'Th (2)
Because of the unit elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables, the
domestic CPI, P.isequal to P10, and, similarly, the foreign CPI, P,isequal to rfp*I.
Three different types of agents live in each country: workers, entrepreneurs, and a class
of unproductive agents that we call "retirees" as a shortcut. The total mass of workers is
2ñ. The total mass of entrepreneurs is 2, each owning a firm for the production of a differ-
entiated good. Hence, a total mass 1 of entrepreneurs own a technology for the production
of a tradable good, while another total mass 1 own a technology for the production of a
nontradable good. Finally, there is a total mass vu of retirees whose only source of income
is a social security benefit. This last class captures what we think is an important feature
of modern industrialized countries, namely the existence of a large constituency of agents
whose main stake in fiscal policy is to maximize redistribution.
2.2 Fiscal policy.
We consider both redistribution from the productive sector to the unproductive sector
('retirees"), and within the productive sector, from employers and employed workers to
unemployed workers. Both policies alter the distribution of income. However, this redistri-
bution persedoes not affect either the size or the composition of demand, since all agents
have the same propensities to spend on the different types of goods. Therefore, all the
effects of fiscal policy occur through the cost effects of taxation and /orthe distortions
induced in the labor market. In the exposition we focus on labor income taxes and social
security taxes paid by employees. Social security taxes paid by employers and payroll taxes
would have the same qualitative effects in our model.
2.3 The structure of the labor market.
We use the foreign country as a benchmark by assuming that the labor market is perfectly
competitive so that full employment always prevails.
7By contrast, in thehome country the labor forceis organized in unions. For simplicity, in
this paper we consider the case of monopoly unions that set the wage in their sub-sector in
order to maximize the expected utility of their members, while in equilibrium employment
is determined by the entrepreneurs given the demand function for the differentiated good
they produce.
Itis well known that the labor market setting we are analyzing here leads to inefficient
wage-employment outcomes. A more general framework, in which the union and the em-
ployersbargainover the wage and the employment, leads to exactly the same qualitative
conclusions, as weshowedin a previous version of this paper. We consider the case of
monopolyunionsonlybecauseit is more intuitive and tractable.
We consider differentinstitutional arrangements, characterized by different degrees of
centralization of thewage-settingprocess. We define the degree of centralization as the
inverse of thenumberof unions,J.We also assume symmetry between the two sectors, so
that thenumberof unions in the exportablesector is the same as the number of unions in
the nontradable sector. Therefore, we consider the case of J an even number, plus thd case
of an economy-wide union encompassing the whole lbor force, J =1.We also assume
symmetry within each sector, so that when J unions are present, each of them sets the wage
for a total mass l/J of firms. Thus, we can identify each union with a sub-sector: each
sub-sector corresponds to the union that sets thewage for its firms. Finally, we assume
symmetryinunion membership: wn.n I union are present, each union has membership
2n/J.
The expected utility of a member of the j-th union in the exportable sectorcan be
found as follows. Let rzbethe mass of employed union members, earning a real after-tax
wage w(l —t)/P,where P is th general price level defined in (2) and I is the income tax
rate. tij— nis then the mass of union members who remain unemployed. Their utility is V,
which is determined by the employment opportunities available in the other sub-sectors.
The representative union takes t as given. In equilibrium, each union member will be
employed with probability n/ni,andunemployed with probability (ñj —n)/ñj.From the
8utility function (1), the expected utility of a union member is then:
VQ)=nw(l—t)+ (3)
As it is customary in the literature, we assume that a monopoly union can prevent
non-union members from being hired in its sub-sector before its unemployed members are
hired. Whenever the wage set by the other J —1unions is higher than the wage at which all
their members are employed, this assumption implies that the members of the j-th union
not employed in the j-tb sub-sector cannot be employed in any other sub-sector, either.
Thus, in this case the utility of unemployed members of the j-th union is II, the utility of
leisure.
In what follows, we consider only symmetric equilibria, in which all unions in a sector
set the same wage. Also, for the problem to be interesting at allwewill always consider
interior solutions to the problem of the representative union, i.e. solutions such that not
all its members are employed. Effectively, then this implies that the alternative utility
available to unemployed workers, V, is always R.
2.4 The current account equilibrium condition.
The model is closed by the condition that the current account between the two countries
must be balanced. This requires that the expenditure on importables by domestic residents
must be equal to the expenditure on exportables by foreign residents.
3 The equilibrium of the economy.
Inthis section,we illustrate the.workingof the model by studying the case J =2,i.e. the
case of one union in the exportable and one union in the nontradable sector. In the next
section we study how the equilibrium varies with the degree of centralization.
3.1 Equilibrium in the foreign country.
Consider first the equilibrium in the foreign country. From the point of view of an individual
firm that takes all other prices as given, the elasticity of the demand for its output is equal
9to the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of goods, a. Therefore, each
firm will price its output at a constant markup a/fr —1)over the wage. Since the labor
market is competitive, the same wage prevails in the two sectors; thus, in a symmetric
equilibrium in the foreign country all tradable and nontradable goods have the same price.
If the foreign wage is the numeraire of the model and is therefore set equal to 1, the price
of all foreign goods is
(4)
The value of output in each sector is equal to the output price p times total output. By the
production function, output is equal to employment. In turn, because of the assumption
of perfectly competitive labor markets full employment prevails in both sectors. Thus, the
valueofoutput in each sector is equal to -1ñ, and national income in the foreign country
is
Y*=2C1n (5)
Thus, the foreign nominal income and the prices of all foreign-produced goods are constant.
lithe home country also had a perfectly competitive labor market, analogous conditions
would hold at home. The presence of unions makes the analysis of the home country dif-
ferent and richer.
3.2 Equilibrium in the home country.
Consider first the equilibrium in the exportable sector. Because there is only one union,
the wage is common to all firms in that sector. Exactly like in the foreign country, each
firm takes the sectoral wage as given and prices its output at a constant markup over that
wage:
(6)
The union in the exportable sector maximizes the expected income of its members, (3), by
setting the wage w and letting employment be determined by the aggregate demand for
labor in the exportable sector.
Because in this model firms do not take the output price as given, the demand for
labor is a function of the demand for output. It can be shown that the total demand for
10exportables Dis:
E
(7)
where P istheprice index for tradables,defined in (2), and Eisthe total expenditure
ofthe two countries on tradables (that is, exportables plus importables), which is equal
to halftheir incomes bythe utilityfunction (1).Expression(7) implies that the demand
forexportables has two components.Thefirst is the redexpenditure on tradables, and
is captured by the termE/P. Thesecond is the price ofexportablesrelativetothatof
importables, and is captured by the term p°/P. 4
The production function y = n implies that in equilibrium D = n, so that from (7) the
derived demand for Labor is
E -ep 8
Insetting thewage, theunionin the exportable sector takes thetotalexpenditureon
tradables E as given but realizes that both p and P are a function of the wage. Contrary
to theindividual firm with mass 0,the union does not take the price index as given: when it
demandsahigherwage, it realizesthatthe price p set by didomesticfirms in theexportable
sectorwill increaseproportionally, andthereforetheprice index of tradablesPwiU also
increase.Thisaffectstheaggregatedemand forlabor intheexportablesectorthrough
twochannels. First, fora given nominal expenditure on tradables E the real demand for
tradablesfalls, asshownby theterm E/P in (8).We callthis the red expenditure effect
of an increase inthe wage. Second, consumerssubstituteaway form exportablestowards
importables,as captured by the term p'/P in (8). This is the substitution effect of an
increase in the wage.
The union maximizes (3) subject to (8). The solution to the problem of the union gives
the real after-tax wage in the exportable sector as a variable markup over the alternative
cost of employment to the union, R:
w(i—t) c
(9) P
4This is a rasher common result in models of monopolistic competition: . for instance Blanchard and
Kyotaki (1987).
11where is the absolute value of the elasticity of the aggregate demand for labor to the wage
as perceived by the union (i.e., taking the aggregate expenditure on tradables E as given),
andis the elasticity of the price index for tradables, P, to the wage in the exportable
sector (or equivalently to the price in the same sector).
To understand expression (9), note that except for the term .y in the denominator, the
expression on the r.h.s. of (9) is analogous to a mark-up solution for a monopolist (the
union)"producing"labor at a constant marginal (opportunity) cost, ii. The termin
the denominator reduces the mark-up charged by the union. This term arises from the
consideration that an increase in wages has an effect on the general price level. The union
takes into account that an increase in wages in its sector is reflected in the output price of
that sector, and therefore in the general price level. The increase in the general price level
in turn reduces the real wages of union members. This effect leads to a moderation of wage
demands relative to the partial equilibrium case of a monopolist taking all other prices as
given.
Now consider the equilibrium in the nontradable sector. The objective function of
the union is the same as in the exportable sector. The only difference is that now no
substitution is possible towards foreign goods; consequently, the union knows that exactly
half of domestic income is spent on nontradables. The derived demand for labor in the
nontradable sector is therefore:
(10)
Theproblem leads to the same implicit expression for the real wage as (9), with two crucial
differences. First, the elasticity of the price index for nontradables 1'tothe wage, 'j', is now
equal to 1. Second, from (10) i (the elasticity of the demand for labor in the nontradable
sector) is now equal to 1, and therefore lower than c, because no substitution is possible
towards foreign.produced goods. Hence, the real after-tax wage in the tradable sector is a
constant markup over
w(1—t)=2R (11)
3.3 Fiscal policy in the home country.
We now study the effects of fiscal policy on competitiveness, the relative price of non-
12tradables, and employmentinthehome country. We focuson purelyredistributivefiscal
policies, defined as policies that would not affect either the composition or the size of de-
mand at the existing prices. We analyze first the case of an increase in transfers to retirees
and then to unemployed workers.
Because the transfer to retirees per se does not alter the size or composition of demand,
it would have no effects at all if financed through a non-distortionary tax.When taxa-
tion is distortionary, however, an increase in transfers to the retirees does have important
macroeconomic effects: it causes a decrease in competitiveness, an increase in the price of
nontradabtes and a decrease in employment in both sectors.
The intuition for our main result is as follows. When the tax rate increases, the unions
in both sectors shift part of the burden of taxation on to the employers by demanding a
higher nominal wage. Hence, the output price in both sectors increases because firms mark-
up over the nominal wage. Since the output price abroad is constant, the home country
experiences a loss of competitiveness. This leads to a fall in employment for two reasons.
First, for a given nominal demand E the demand for exportables falls because of the real
expenditure and the substitution effects (see (8)). Second, to preserve the equilibrium in
the current account, the national income and therefore the nominal demand E must fall.
In fact, the current account equilibrium condition requires that the nominal expenditure
on importables by domestic residents be equal to the nominal expenditure on exportables
by foreign residents. From (7), the current account equilibrium condition then implies:
Y I—,
_________— p 12
pI_' + p*'0
—p'+ p"
From this condition one gets:
y = (13)
Thus,the national income Y decreases when p increases: the reason is that, to ensure a
balanced current account, the domestic demand for importables must fall. Even at constant
relative prices, this would require a fall in the home national income. A fortiori, the home
51n our model,acorporate income tax is one such tax: in each firm, the output price is the same mazkup
over the wage, and the problem of the union is not affected by the presence of the tax. Thus, a corporate
income tax is non-distortiona.ry, since there is no capital in this model and the owners of the firma are
immobile.
13national income must decrease because the relative price of importables has fallen. Since
E =(Y+ Y)/2, and *isfixed in nominal terms, E too decreases. We call this effect the
nominal expenditure effect of an increase in the wage of the exportable sector.
In addition, if the elasticity of substitution between goods is high enough, the relative
price of nontradables appreciates according to the following mechanism. The increase in
both sectors' output prices causes the general price level P to increase, thereby reducing
the real wage. This last effect induces the unions in both sectors to moderate their wage
claims. In the nontradable sector, the price index for nontradables and therefore the gem
eral price level increase in the same proportion as the wage. In the exportable sector, on
one hand the price level increases less than proportionally to the wage, as consumers shift
consumption away from exportables. This induces the union in the exportable sector to
make higher wage demands than in the nontradable sector. On the other hand, as the
union increases the wage, the elasticity of the demand for labor increases; this induces the
union in the exportable sector to demand a lower markup of the real wage over ft than
in the nontradable sector. If the elasticit v of substitution between goods is large enough
(c > 2 in our model), the second effect prevails: 6thus,while both the wage and therefore
the price in the nontradable and exportable sectors increase, the former increases propor-
tionally more than the latter. We can now state:
Proposition 1:
An increase in redistribution to the retirees financed by an increase in the income tax rate
leads to:
(I) an increase in the price of exportables, i.e. a decrease in competitiveness;
(ii) an increase in the relative price of nontradables, provided the elasticity of substitution
between goods is sufficiently high (a > 2);
(iii) a decrease in employment in both sectors.
Proof:
See the Appendix.
'Note that the condition e> ha typically a necessary condition for equilibrium in model of monopolistic
competition(see e.g. Blanchardand Kiyotaki (1987)). Here we have a more restrictive condition to ensure
the expected effects of tradablesversus nontradables.
14We now turn to thesecondtype of fiscal policy by considering redistribution within
the productive sector, from employed workers and entrepreneurs to unemployed workers.
Suppose that the unemployed receive an unemployment benefit B which is indexed to the
CPL P. Thus, their utility is now equal to the sum of the utility of leisure, R, and the
unemployment benefit, B. Suppose also that at least part of tax revenues are used to
finance an increase in B.
The union takes R and B as given. Thus, the problem of the union is still given by
expression (3), with the only difference that the alternative utility of unemployed workers
is P + B rather than IL Similarly, the optimal wage set by the union in the tradable and
nontradable sector is still given by expressions (9) and (11) respectively, again with the only
difference that the r.h.s.'s are functions of P + B rather than II. When taxes increase, now
the wage set by the union increases for two reasons. The first is familiar: the union reacts
to the decrease in the after.tax wage by demanding a higher nominal wage. The second
reason is specific to the type of redistribution we are considering: because taxes are used
to increase B, the alternative utility available to unemployed workers increases, inducing
the union to demand a still higher wage. This is the intuition for our second result, that
we summarize in the following:
Proposition 2:
An increase in redistribution to the unemployed, regardless of how it is financed, leads to:
(i) an increase in the price of exportables, i.e. a decrease in competitiveness;
(ii) an increase in the relative price of nontradables, provided the elasticity of substitution
between goods is sufficiently high (c >2);
(iii) a decrease in employment in both sectors.
Proof;
The proof is an immediate generalization of the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
In summary, our two propositions emphasize the effects of distortionary taxation and
of redistribution on competitiveness and the relative price of nontrada.bles. In the case
15of Proposition I, the crucial feature is the distortionary effects of taxation. In fact, a
redistribution to retirees financed by lump-sum taxes would not have the effects summarized
by Proposition I. On the other hand, the type of redistribution studied in Proposition 2
woutd have the same qualitative effects even if it were financed with non-distortionary
taxation.
4Labormarkets and fiscal policy.
In this section, we study how the equilibrium illustrated in the previous section varies with
the degree of centralization 1/J.
Becausethere are J/2 unions in the exportable sector, from (8) the demand for labor
facing the union in the f-tb exportable sub-sector is:
2E'
wherethe subscript "J" indicates that there are J unions in the economy. The wage set
by the union affects the demand for labor in its sub-sector through the three channels
described in the preceding section: the real expenditure, the substitution and the nominal
expenditure effects.
We assume that only very large unions internalize the last effect. Small unions take the
total nominal expenditure Easgiven. We believe that this asymmetry in the internaliza-
tion of the different effects of an increase in the sub-sectoral wage and price captures an
important aspect of unions' behavior, Internalizing the first two effects requires only two
straightforward passages: the union must realize that (i) a higher output price reduces the
output demand and (ii) a higher wage is reflected in a higher output price. Internalizing
the third effect, that operates via the current account, requires taking into consideration
an equilibrium condition and the corresponding repercussion effects between two countries.
It seems realistic to assume that only large unions will internalize this effect. In particular,
and only for expository purposes, we assume that only a large, economy-wide union that
encompasses the whole labor force internalizes this effect. In the Appendix, we generalize
this result by showing that our results hold for the generic case where unions internalize
16the nominalexpenditure effect whenever the number of unions is less than an arbitrary
number J'.
We first consider the equilibrium in labor markets where the unions take the total
nominal expenditure E as given. The solution to the problem of the representative j-th
union has the familiar form:
w(l_t)Rc'
P
—
Cj—l+7j
15)
where cj is the elasticity of the aggregate demand for labor to the wage in the i-tb ex-
portable subsector when there are J unions in the economy, and 7j is the elasticity of the
price indexforexportables P to the wage in the same sub-sector.
Clearly, the larger the typical union -thelower J -thehigher is the effect of an increase
in the union wage on the general price level, represented by the term fyj.Thiseffect then
implies that the wage should be higher in more decentralized labor markets. However, the
demand for labor Cj too depends on the number of unions J: larger unions face a less elastic
labor demand. The intuition is the following: when a very small union increases the wage,
the resulting increase in the output price of that sub-sector implies i loss of market to all
the other domestic sub-sectors in the exportable sector and to all foreign producers. As
the union gets larger and encompasses more domestic producers, the output price of more
and more doemstic producers move together. In the extreme, when one union organizes
all the labor force in the exportable sector, the union must only worry about substitution
towards importables, since all the substitution within the exportable sector is eliminated.
Therefore, this second effect implies that the elasticiiy of the demand for labor facing a
union is higher in more decentralized labor markets. This effect than implies that the real
wage should be lower in more decentralized labor markets.
As long as the unions take E as given, an increase in the degree of centralization
has therefore two contrasting effects on the wage set by unions. When the elasticity of
substitution between goods is sufficiently large (> 2in our model) the second effect,
whose magnitude is directly related to the elasticity of substitution between goods, prevails.
Following the same intuition, it is relatively straightforward to show that in the non-
tradable sector too the wage increases with the degree of centralization of the labor market.
17In addition, and exactly like in the case of one union per sector analyzed in section 3, it
is still true that, for any given J and any given wage the elasticity of the price index for
nontradables to the wage in the j-th nontradable sub-sector is lower than in the exportable
sector: 7jcyj.Thisdifference implies that in a symmetric equilibrium the wage and the
output price in the nontradable sector will always be higher than in the exportable sector.
Now consider a highly centralized labor market, where a single union that encompasses
all 2n workers sets the same wage in both the exportable and nontradable sector. Besides
internalizing all the effects on prices of the wage it sets, this large union also internalizes
the effects on the aggregate nominal demand E that occur through the current account
equilibrium condition. This labor market arrangement leads to the lowest equilibrium wage
and the highest level of employment. There are two reasons for this, both working in the
same direction. First, the elasticity of the demand for labor perceived by the union, c.j
inexpression (15), is higher than in any decentralized labor market, since now the union
realizes that E fails when the economy-wide wage increases. Second, the elasticity of the
price level P to the union wage is the highest of all labor market arrangements, since all
domestic wages and prices increase together. Thus, in a centralized labor market the wage
in the exportable sector is lower then in any other type of labor market. In addition, the
difference between the equilibrium wages in the exportable and importable sector is the
lowest -andit is actually 0 -becausethe wage is the same in the two sectors.
More generally, consider two labor markets, both with the same number J of unions. In
the first labor market the unions take E as given, while in the second they do not. Then it
is easy to show that the wage in both sectors will be lower in the second labor market. In
addition, once the unions start internalizing the nominal expenditure effect, the wage set
by the unions becomes lower as She degree of centralization increases. The reason is that
whenever a union internalizes the effects of an increase in their wage on E, the elasticity
of the demand of labor jisalways a, indipendently of the size of the union, However, the
elasticity of the price level P to the wage is higher the larger the union. Thus, from (15),
as the number of unions increases the wage they demand decreases, because larger unions
internalize more fully the effects of their wage demands on the real wage of their members.
As long as unions do not internalize the nominal expenditure effect, however, as we
18showed abovethe wage increasesasthe number ofunions decreases. Thisimpliesthat, if
the unions start internalizing the nominal expenditure effect when there are f unions in the
economy, the wage will first increase as J increases and then, after the number of unions
exceedsJ',it will start declining as J increases. Thus, the relation between the degree of
centralization l/J (the number of unions J) and the wage has a U-shaped (hump-shaped)
behavior.
The following proposition summarizes the results of this section:
Proposition 3:
(i) the relation between competitiveness and the degree of centralization of the wage-
setting process is U-shaped: as the degree of centralization increases, competitiveness first
decreases, then increases.
(ii) the relation between the relative price of non-tradables and the degree of centraliza-
tion of the wage-setting process is also U-shaped: as the degree of centralization increases,
competitiveness first decreases, then increases.
(iii) the relation between unemployment and the degree of centralization of the wage-setting
process is hump-shaped: as the degree of centralization increases, unemployment first in-
creases, then decreases.
-
Proof:
See the Appendix.
5Estimationresults.
Ourmodelhinges on the relationship between two variables, competitiveness and labor
taxation. In the model, the driving force behind all price movements is labor costs. Ac-
that the main results of this section agree with a recent empirical literature that has found a
hump-shaped relationship between the level of unemployment and the degree of centrabsatson zn wage
bargaining in OECDcounbtries:see Caimfors and Drifilt (1989) and Freeman (1989). We are not the
firsttoformalize this hump-shaped relationship between the degree of centralization and the wage: see
Calmfors (1993) for a surveyofthe recent theoretical literature on the topic. 'lb our knowledge, however,
our explanation is novel.
19cordingly, oUr first measure of competitiveness is unit labor costs in manufacturing. The
Intersectoral Database contains data on employment, the capital stock, total compensation,
indirecttaxes and valueaddedat current and constant prices,from 1960 to 1990, for 14
countriesand 20 sectors.We use thisdatasetto construct series on unit labor costs, value
addeddeflators, and total factor productivityinthe tradable andnontradable sectors. The
advantageofthissource is that itprovides aconsistent datasetfor allthepriceandcost
variableswe need.
Themeasureoftaxationthat comesconceptually closest to that of the paper is "Di-
rect taxes paid by households" in the "Accounts for household andprivateunincorporated
enterprises" of theOECD Nationallaconic Accounts. This variable includes almost exclu-
sively labor income taxation. Moreover,becausethe breakdown between labor andother
income taxationis available onlyfor a few countries, we take this variable as our proxy for
directlaborincome taxation.Ifdirect taxation were proportional, social security contri-
butions paidby employees (which are usually proportional)wouldbe equivalentto direct
taxationfromthe pointofview of a union. Thus, a second definition of labor taxation
wouldincludesocial securitytaxespaid by employees in addition to income taxation. A
third,stillmoregeneraldefinition of labor taxationwouldalso include social security taxes
paid by employers and payroll taxes. We test our model using all three definitionsoflabor
taxation. in each case, we obtain a measure of the average labor tax rate by dividing tax
revenues by GDP. For future reference, we call this class of measures of tax rates CDP-
based tax rates.Asa further check, we estimate our model using a second definition of the
average labor tax rate, obtained by dividing the three different definitions of tax revenues
given above by total wages and salaries rather than by (3DP. We call this second class of
taxe rates wage-based tax rates.,
Regardless of the tax measure used, our central hypothesis is that an increase in labor
taxation causes an increase in relative unit labor costs, i.e. &lossof competitiveness.
Moreover, the effect of taxation on unit labor costs are hump-shaped: they are largest in
countries with an intermediate degree of centralization in labor markets.
5The countries are: Australia, Belgium, Canada,Denmark,Finland, Ftance, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherland, Norway, Sweden, UnitedKingdom,United States.
20To measure the degree of centralization of labor markets, we use the index constructed
by Calmfors and Driffill (1988), which we reproduce in Table 11. This index ranks countries
in descending order of centralization, with the most centralized country (Norway) receiving
a score of 1 and the most decentralized (Canada) receiving a score of 14.Relative to
other indicesavailable in the literature, the Calmfors-Driffill index hastheadvantagethat
itmeasures exactly the feature we highlight in our paper, the number of unions in each
country. '°Itsrationale is very similar to that used by Cameron (1984) in constructing
his index, which we also report in Table 11. The two indices are indeed very similar, and
they give very similar results. In fact, in general we obtain stronger results when we use
the Cameron index, although for lack of space we only report results based on the more
commonly used Calmfors-Driffill index.
We use two different approaches to test the hump-shaped effect of labor taxation on
unit labor costs. First (Tables 2 and 6) we interact our tax variable with the index of
centralization and with the square of the same index. According to our model, the first
interactive term should have a positive coefficient and the second a negative one: as the
index increases and labor markets become more decentralized, the effect of an increase
in income taxation on costs first rises, then falls. The second approach (Tables 7 to 10)
consists in dividing our sample of countries in three groups, according to the Calmfors-
Driffill index, and allowing for a different coefficient of the tax variable for each group. The
second group should have the highest coefficient.
In Table 2 the dependent variable here is multilateral unit labor costs in manufacturing.
For each country1 this variable is defined as the ratio of its own unit labor costs to a
geometric average of the unit labor costs of all the other countries in the sample, with
weights equal to their GDP shares in 1980. The r.h.s. variables are defined the same way.
The tax variable is our first GDP-based tax rate, direct taxes paid by household divided
by GDP. Since our sample stretches over different exchange rate regimes and year-to-year
variations in nominal exchange rates not related to fundamentals might introduce some
9Three countries that appear in the Caimfors-Driffill index -Austria,New Zealand and Switzerland -
arenot present in our sample. We re-ranked the countries from 1 to 14 after excluding these countries.
'°For the same reasons, this is the index used by Summers, GruberandVerg&a(1993).
21noise in our estimates, we include year as well as country dummies in our regressions.
Columns (I) to (4) present various estimates of the most basic specification: relative
unit laborcosts dependon total factor productivity, TFP, and on the two tax variables,
INCTAX *Iand INCTAX *I,where I denotes the centralization index. "Incolumn
(1) no other regressors appear on the r.h.s.; in column (2) we add country dummies, and
in column (3) year dummies; finally, in column (4) (and all subsequent regressions) we add
both country and year dummies. In all these regressions, the coefficients of the productivity
and tax variables have the expected sign, are highly significant, and are remarkably stable.
The coefficients of INCTAX*J and JNCTAX*12 imply that the cost effect of an increase
in income taxation is highest when I =6,almost exactly the middle point of the range
spanned by I, which goes from ito 14.
In column (5) we control for demand factors in the regressions. The demand proxies we
choose ae the ratio of non-wage government consumption to GDP, CGNW,and the
ratio of government transfers to GDP, TRANFERS, 13Bothvariables are insignificant,
economically and statistically, 'andtheir inclusion in the regression does not affect the
estimates of the coefficients of the tax variables.
In column (6) we control for the aggregate unemployment rate, UNEMPL. Its coeffi-
cient has the expected sign, although it is not significant at the 10% level: when conditions
in the labor market deteriorate, unit labor costs decrease. Needless to say, one should be
careful in drawing any strong conclusions from this regression because of the endogeneity
"Productivitycaneasilybe introduced in the modeldeveloped so far by rewriting the production
function as p =an, wherea is productivity. Unit labor costs then can be written as ULC =tv/a. Itcan
easilybeshown that in our model the gainsofan increase in productivity are appropriated partly by the
union in the form of higher wages and partly by entrepreneurs in the form of lugher profits. Therefore,
unit labor costs decrease when productivity improves. Because of the presence of monopoly power, we
estimate total factor productivity growth using the formula TF.P =dy—p'sLd1—(i—p'-sL)dk, wherey,
I and k are the logarithms of value added, labor and capital respectively, s is the share of labor in value
added and p' is the value-added-based mark-up. We constructed p' from the formula / =, where
p is the output-based markup andis the share of intermediate input in output. We assumed • value
of 1.57 for p, which is the average value obtained by Ball (1988) for manufacturing, and 5M= .5,which i5
also typical in this literature, We also experimented with lower values of p, and the results did not change
substantially.
'2Non-wage government consumption typically represents between one third and one fourth of total
government consumption. We do not include the wage component of government consumption because of
obvious endogeneity problems in a regression that has unit labor costs as the dependent variable.
'3This variable is the sum of social security payments and other transfer payments by the government.
t1Thelackof significance of these two variables is not due to their collinearity: virtually the same point
estimatesandt-statistjcs obtain when the two variables are includedseparately.
22of the rate of uiieinployment. Notice., however, that the coefficients of the tax variables
retriai largely unaffected by the introduction of the unemployment rate.
A possible problem in the regressions of Table 2 is that the average tax rate mightbe
correlatedwith the rate of inflation. Because the tax system is progressiveand income
taxbrackets are in general not indexed, during periods of high inflation many taxpayers
tend to be pushed up to higher brackets merely because their nominal income increases.
As a result, the average tax rate increases. To the extent that wage and price inflation
are correlated, this effect might bias our estimates of the coefficient of the average income
Lax rate away from 0. We have addressed this problem by reestimating all our regressions
excluding all years for which the rate of change of the GDP deflator was higher than 10% in
at least one country. A typical estimate is showxi in column (7) of Table 2, which replicates
the regression of column (4). As one can see, excluding high-inflation years does not affect
the coefficients of the tax variables.
What is the economic significance of the results that emerge from Table 2? The average
share of personal income taxes in GDP in the sample is 12.1%, with a standard deviation
of 5.56%. The estimate of the coefficient of INCTAX.1 inTable 2 when country and year
dummies are included is always .12, and the estimate of the coefficient of INCTAX*P
is always -.01. Thus, the largest effect of taxation on unit labor costs occur when I=6,
which implies an elasticity of unit labor costs to the tax rate of .36 (.36 = .12*6..01*62).
Using this value, when the average share of personal income taxes in CDP increases by
1% to 13.1%, the loss of competitiveness in manufacturing is 2.98% (2.98 = .36/.121).
Vhieii the share of personal income taxes in GDP increases by one standard deviation,
competitiveness falls by a sizable 16.54%. These values are economically significant, if one
considers that it is not uncommqn to observe movements in the average income tax rate of
several percentage points, particularly in countries that are adjusting their budgets.
Table 3 is similar to Table 2, except that now the tax variables indude social security
and payroll taxes, in addition to direct income taxation. In the first two columns labor
taxation includes social security taxes paid by employees; in the two remaining columns,
it also includes social security taxes paid by employers and payroll taxes.
Sliecause data on social security and payroll taxes are available only from 1965, the sample period is,
23The resultsin Table 3 are very similar to those of Table 2; the sizes of the coefficients
are nowslightly higher, as one would expect since the valuesofthe taxvariableare larger
thaninTable2, and still significant.
We now turn to the issue of sub-sample stability. In all the relations estimatedsofar,
the elfects of taxationturn outto be stronger if the 80's are left out of the sample. A likely
explanation is that the year-to-year variability of the multilateral nominal exchange rate
increased substantially in the 80's. This is demonstrated in Table 4, which shows, for each
country, the variance of the annual rate of changeofthe nominalexchangerate inthree
periods: the 60's and 70's (column (1)), the 1973-1980 period (column (2)), and the 80's
(column(3)). Columns(4)and (5) display the ratio of the third to the first and of the
third to the second, respectively. It is clear that the variance of the annual rate of change
of the multilateral exchange rate was much higher in the 80's than in the two previous
decades(column (4)), and this remainstrueevenifthe comparison is between the 80's
and the 1973-1980 period (column (5)); furthermore, this applies even to the countries that
entered the EMS in the '80's- 16Oneimportant underlying causeofthe pattern displayed
inTable 4 is thestrong fluctuations ofthe dollarinthe first half of the 80's.Infact, it is
interesting to note that the countriesthat experienced the highestvariability of the rate of
changeof the exchange rate in the '80's relative to the 1973-1980 period aretheEuropean
countries that pegged their currency to the D-Marlcmostclosely.
We illustrate the implications of the discussion above for the stability of the estimates
of the model using the second definition of the tax rate, with total wages and salaries rather
thanGDP as the denominator.However,everything we say here applies totheanalysisof
the first definition ofthetaxrate that wehave used so far.
We also checked therobustness of ourresultsby defining thetax variables as tax
revenuesdivided by wages rather than (IDP.Considerthe simplest regression we have dis-
played sofar,in column (1) of Table 2, where thetax variableon the r.hs wasconstructed
as tax revenues divided by nominal GDP. Thedependent variableis constructed as total
effectively,1965-90.
'6Recall that these figures refer to theannualvariance of the nominal exchange rate, and therefore
reflect the frequent, thscrete realignements within the EMS until1987This is entirely consistent with the
nominal exchange rate being less variable in the SO's in European countries at higher frequencies.
24nominal compensation divided by real value addedinmanufacturing. To the extent that
nominal GDP and real value added in manufacturing are correlated, the positive estimated
relationship between the tax rate and unit labor costs might be influenced by the fact that
two highly correlated variables appear at the denominator of the two variables on the two
sides of the regression.
By defining the tax rate as tax revenues divided by total wages and salaries, now we
have the opposite feature: two highly correlated variables -.totalwages and salaries the
economy and total compensation in manufacturing, appear at the denominator and the
numerator, respectively, on the r.h.s. and the l.h.s. If variations in wages and salaries
dominate the behavior of unit labor costs and of the tax rate, one should now expect that
a negative relation between the two will be picked up by our estimates. If instead the
estimated effect of the tax rate is still positive, one can feel confident that the relation
being estimated is not caused by the way we constructed the tax variables.
Thus, in Table 5 the tax base is total wages and salaries.The dependent variable is
always multilateral unit labor costs. hi column (1) the sample is the entire 1965-90 period
and the labor tax rate is calculated as direct taxes paid by households (the same measure
that appears in Tables 2) divided by total wages and salaries. All coefficients are very
similar to those of column (5) in Table 2, which represents the same same regression but
with the GDP-based definition of the tax rate. However, because the sample average of
the wage-based definition of the tax rate is higher than for the GDP-based definition, these
coeffcients represent smaller effects of the tax rate on unit labor costs than the coefficients
in Table 2. This too was to be expected in light of tL considerations we developed above.
Furthermore, the t-statistics on the coefficients of the tax variables are lower.
The next three columns of Table 5 display the results of regressions over the 60's and 70's
only. In each column, the tax rate is constructed from different concepts of tax revenues.
The denominator is always total wages and salaries; however, in column (2), the numerator
is direct taxes only, as in column (1); in column (3), it is direct taxes plus social security
taxes paid by employe; finally, in column (4) it is direct taxes paid by households plus
"We define the tax base as total compensation less payroll taxes and social security taxes paid by
employers. The estimated coefficients are very similar when social security and payroll taxes are not
subtracted from total compensation.
25total social security taxes (paid by employees, employers and self-employed) and payroll
taxes.
Regardlessof the definition of the tax variable, the pattern that emerges from these
estimates is very clear. In all the three columns,both the sizeof the coefficients and the
t-statistics increase substantially relative to those of column (1).
In Table 6 we estimate the effects of taxation on the relative price of nontradables.
The model predicts that an increase in the average labor tax rate should cause the price of
nontradables to rise relative to that of tradables. Our measure of the price of nontradables is
the value added deflator in construction and in transportation, always from the intersect oral
Database. Thereason why we consider only these two sectors among services is one of
availability of data: for instance, if we had included retail trade in our measure, the number
of observations would have dropped drastically. By using only the value added deflator in
construction and transportation we lose only two countries, Italy and Netherlands, relative
to the regressions we have presented so far.
The results broadly confirm the predictions of the model. Because of space con-
straints, we present only results pertaining to labor taxation defined as income, social
security and payroll taxes; the other two, less comprehensive definitions give very similar
results. Also, we divide tax revenues by GDP in the first two columns, and by total com-
pensation less payroll and social security taxes paid by employers in the last two columns.
One might argue that inflation is typically associated with an appreciation of the rel-
ative price of nontradables because the price of tradables is less flexible upward due to
international competition (see for instance De Cregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1993)). To
address this issue, in columns (2) and (4) we include the rate of change of the GDP deflator
among the regressors.
The coefficients of the average labor tax rates always have the expected signs, and
are always strongly significant at the 5% level. Notice only that, as usual, the size and
significance level of the coefficients of the tax rates fail slightly in regressions using the
"To construct total factor productivity growth in the nontradable sector, we used the same formula as
Infootnote10, but with a value for p', the value-added-based markup, of 2.35, the sa used by, among
others, Benabou (1992) for theretailsector andderived from anestimate of p, the output-baied markup
in the retail sector1 of 1.40inHall (1958). Again, the results were not sensitive to other values of p' in the same range.
26wage-based definition of the tax rate. Overall, the results are strongly supportive of our
hypothesis: there is a positive effect of labor taxation on the relative price of nontradables,
and this effect has the hypothesized inverted-U shape as a function of the degree of cen-
tralization. Moreover, in all cases the labor tax variables are the only significant variable,
besides relative total factor productivity.
A second way to estimate the relationship between the degree of labor market decentral-
ization and fiscal policy is to group the countries in three categories, with high,intermediate
and low centralization of labor markets as measured by the Calinfors-Driffill index, and al-
low for a different coefficient of the tax variable for each group. The first group of countries
comprises Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland; the second group includes Germany,
Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, and France, and the third group the U.K., Italy, Japan,
U.S., and Canada. One advantage of this approach is that it imposes fewer restrictions on
the shape of the relationship between labor market decentralization and effects of taxation.
In the regressions of Tables 2 to 6, the same two coefficients governed the change in the
shifting of taxation when going from values of the Caimfors-Driffill index of, say, I =1to
I =2as when going from I =i3to I =14.Ideally, of course, with enough observations
one would estimate a different coefficient for each country. Grouping our countries in three
categories is a compromise in this direction.
Therefore, in Tables 7 to 10 we estimates the same regressions as in Table 2, 3, 5
and 6 respectively, except that now the tax variables on the r.h.s. are NCTAX • Il,
!NCTAX *12and INCTAX *13,where 11, 12 and 13 are dummy variables taking the
value of 1 in correspondence of countries of the first, second and third group, respectively..
Since these tables, apart from the different use of the labor tax variables, are identical
to the tables we have already analysed, here we just highlights the main new conclusions
one can draw from them. First, all of tables 7 to 10 are again consistent with the thry: in
countries with an intermediate degree of centralization labor taxes have stronger effects on
unit labor costs than in the other two types of countries. The interesting contribution of this
second set of tables is that the shifting of taxes is much higher in highly centralized countries
(associated with 11) than in highly decentralized countries (associated with 12). In fact, in
highly decentralized countries the coefficient is always very close to 0 (and in several cases,
27negative) and never statistically different from 0, while in highly centralized countries
it is positive and close to that of countries with intermediate degrees of centralization.
Moreover, the estimate of the coefficient of INCTAX* 11often is not statistially different
from that of INCTAX *12,while that of JNCTAX *13 is.Interestingly, this result is
exactly consistent with our model. In fact, recall the main mechanism that leads to less
shifting of taxation in highly centralized labor markets: the unions internalize the external
constraint, and this effect offsets the tendency towards more shifting associated with more
centralization, which is still present in all these countries. Our estimates therefore show
that in highly centralized labor markets the internalization of the external constraint just
prevents the effects of this tendency towards more shifting of taxation, but does not bring
the wage and competitiveness back to the level of a very decentralized labor market. Note
also that, in general, only the coefficients INCTAX *12 arestatistically significant, which
is again consistent with the model. 19
Second, thepoint estimates of the coefficients too are highly consistent with those in
the previous set of tables.Forinstance, the estimated coefficient of the tax variable in
the second group of countries in column (1) of Table 6 is .35, which is practically identical
to estimate of the coefficient at the top of the inverted-U curve estimated in column (1)
of Table 2. Overall, we conclude that the results of Tables 7 to 10,whileproviding some
interesting new information, confirm the robustness of the results of Tables 2 to 6.
6 Conclusions.
In industrial countries, redistributive expenditures represent a larger fraction of govern-
ment budgets than purchases of goods and services. This paper provides theoretical un-
derpinnings and empirical support for the view that redistributive fiscal policies affect the
competitiveness of open economies. This is a burning issue in policy debates: discussions
about reforms of the "welfare state" to alleviate the burden on the productive side of the
economy are everywhere. However, standard competitive macro models of open economies
The exceptions is Table 10, where the dependent variable is the relative price of nontradahies: here,
when labor taxation is dividedbyGDP, .11 three coefficients of the tax variable are significant.
28with representativeindividuals cannot fully address these problems.
We have presented a model that departsfromstaiidard assumptions in three ways:
(i) we do not have a representative agent but1 instead, three groups of individuals with
different interests; (ii) we consider unionized labor markets; (iii) we have a monopolistically
competitive economy. These assumptions give rise to a tractable but relatively rich model
well equipped to address a variety of issues related to fiscal redistribution. We have begun
to study some of these issues in this paper, but the same modelling structure can be applied
to other problems.
A particularly important point that we left out of our discussion is the endogenous
determination of policies. In our paper redistributive fiscal policies are exogenous. A more
complete treatment should show how the different groups interact to generate such policies
in a political equilibrium. Our model, that implies meaningful conflicts of interest among
groups and sectors, can be a useful stepping stone in this direction.
This model also lends itself to the study of different fiscal policy problems, in particular
related to fiscal adjustments and fiscal reforms. Because the crucial politico-economy issue
in fiscal adjustments has to do with redistributions, our model seems well equipped to
capture, albeit in a simplified manner, some important aspects of the problem.
29'Fable 2:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)(7)(')
60-9060-9060-9060-9060-9060-9060-90
APP -.28 -.37 -/29 -.39 -.40 -.34 -.34
(-3.04) (-3.79) (-3.14) (-3.93) (-3.77)(-3.08)(-2.99)
INCTAX */ .10 .11 .11 .12 .12 .12 .11
(2.62)(2.90)(2.47)(2.77)(2.80)(2.83)(2.32)
INCTAA'.!**2-.008 -.01 -.009 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01
(-2.36) (-2.74)(-2.21)(-2.58) (-2.68)(-2.66)(-2.35)
TRANSFERS .006
(.04)
CGNW .19
(1.46)
IJIVEMPL -.04
(-1.20)
yeardummies? no no yes yes yes yes yes
countrydummies?no yes no yes yes yes yes
adj.R2 .05 .06 .06 .07 .07 .07 .06
NODS 305 305 305 305 301 304 250
Dependentvariable: muttilatera unit labor costs. t-statistics in parentheses.°:excludes
observations with inflation higher than 10%,
30Table 3:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
65-9065-9065-90 65-90
TFP -.42 -.37 -.39 -.34
(-3.65)(-3.04) (-3.37)(-2.80)
INCTAX *1 .11 .12 .13 .14
(2.19)(2.21)(2-27)(2.35)
!NCTAX*I.t*2-.01 -.01 -.01 -.01
(-2.04)(-2.01) (-1.95)(-1.98)
TRANSFERS .006 -.002
(.05) (-.01)
CGNW .12 .09
(.88) (.69)
UNEMPL -.03 -.03
(-.88) (-.89)
adj.R2 .07 .07 .07 .07
NOBS 281 284 281 284
Dependent variable:multilateralunit labor costs. t-statistics in
parentheses. All regressions include year and country dummies.
Tax rate in columns (1) and (2): direct taxation plus social security
taxes paid by employeesdividedby GD?. Tax rate in columns (3)
and (4): direct taxation plus social security taxes paid by employees
and employers plus payroD taxes divided by GDP.
31Table 4:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
60-80 73-80 80-90 (3)/U)(2)/0)
Australia .0106 .0057 .0101 .95 1.76
Belgium .0006 .0007.008613.50 11.93
Canada .0027 .0053 .00481.81 .92
Denmark .0007 .0020 .00729.75 3.54
Finland .0029 .0024 .0027 .92 1.09
France .0018 .0034 .00774.23 2.24
Germany .0011.0012 .00625.58 5.02
Italy .0025 .0038 .00722.85 1.92
Japan .0029 .0070 .00722.45 1.03
Netherlands .0007 .0017 .00461.87 .86
Norway .0008 .0017 .00151.87 .86
Sweden .0008 .0019 .00465.88 2.39
United Kingdom .0029 .0071 .00341.18 .48
United States.0008 .0016 .00556.92 3.42
Column (1): variance of rate of change of multilateral nominal exchange
rate in 1960-SO (Column (1)), 1973-80 (Column (2)), and 1980-90 (Col-
umn (3)). Column (4): ratio of correaponding catty of Column (3) to
correspondingentry ofColumn (1). Column (5): ratio of conespooding
entryof Column (2) to corresponding entry of Column(1).
32Table 5:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
65-9065-8065-8065-80
TFP -.44 -.53 -.53 -.53
(-3.83)(-3.62)(-3.63)(-3.55)
INCTAX *1 .10 .17 .17 .22
(1.92)(2.58)(2.30)(2.56)
INCTAX*I**2-.01 -.016-.016 -.02
(-2.09) (-2.68) (-2.32)(-2.61)
TRANSFERS -.003 -.09 -.08. -.08
(-.02)(-.57)(-.49) (-.52)
CCNW .18 .11 .11 .07
(1.27)(.71)(.64) (.43)
adj.R2 .06 .12 .10 .11
NOBS 281 149 149 149
Dependent variable:multilateralunit labor cats. t-statistics in
parentheses. All regressions include country and year dummies.
Tax rate in columns (1) and (2): direct taxation divided by total
wages and saland. Tax rate in column (3): direct taxation plus
social security taxes paid by employees, divided by total wages and
salaries. Tax rate in column (4): direct taxation plus social security
taxes paid by employees and employers pius payroll taxes, divided
by total wages and salaries.
33Table 6:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
65-9065-9065-90 65-90
TFP -.21 -.21 -.20 -.20
(-5.31) (-5.37) (.4.99)(-5.09)
INCTAX *1 .075 .077 .063 .063
(3.42)(3.50)(2.42)(2.53)
1NCTAX*1**2 -.005-.005-.005 -.005
(-2.49)(-2.58)(-2.09)(-2.18)
TRANSFERS -.01 -.02
(-.19) (-36)
CGNW .006 .05
(Al) (.89)
INFL .002 .003
(.30) (.44)
adj.R3 .32 .32 .28 .28
NODS 243 243 243 243
Dependent vaziable: relativepriceof uontra4ables. t-statistics in
parentheses. Thx rate incolumns (1) and(2):directtaxation
plussocialsecuritytaxespaidby employees andemployersplus
payroll taxes, divided by GD?. Thx rate in columns(3)and(4):
direct taxation plus social security taxes paid by employees and
employers plus payroll taxes, divided by total wages and salaries.
34Table 7:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)fr)
60-9060-9060-9060-9060-9060-9060-90
TFP -.28 -.37 -.30 -.40 -.40 -.35 -.34
(-3.11) (-3.82) (-3.23) (-3.98) (-3.78) (-3.15)(-3.02)
INCTAX•11 .30 .29 .29 .28 .26 .29 .20
(2.62)(2.90)(2.47)(2.77)(2.80)(2.83)(2.32)
INCTAX•12 .35 .35 .36 .37 .38 .37 .36
(2.60)(2.62)(2.57)(2.60)(2.63)(2.60)(2.09)
!NCTAX.13 -.02 -.07 -.01 -.06 -.10 -07 -.18
(-.14)(-.58)(-.06)(-.43)(-.77)(-.50)(-1.03)
TRANSFERS -.02
(-.20)
CGNW .19
(1.49)
UNEMPL -.03
(-1.16)
year dummies? no •no yes yes yes yes - yes
country dummies?no yes no yes yes yes yes
adj.R3 .06 .06 .07 .07 .08 .08 .05
Dependent variable: multilateral unit labor costs. t-statistics in parentheses. excludes
observations with indation higher than 10%.
35Table 8:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
65-9065-9065-90 65-90
TEP -.42 -.37 -.39 -.35
(-3.65)(-3.09) (4.41) (-2.89)
INCTAX*11 .23 .27 .28 .32
(1.26)(1.49)(1.45) (1.69)
INCTAX*12 .41 .39 .57 .54
(2.19) (2.12)(2.56) (2.48)
INCTAX*13-.11 -.07 -.01 -.04
(-.56)(-.36)(-.06) (-.21)
TRANSFERS-.02 -.01
(-.14) (—.10)
CCNW .13 .10
(.93) (.71)
UNEMPL -.03 -.03
(-.87) (- .85)
adj.R2 .07 .07 .07 .08
NOBS 281 284 281 284
Dependentvariable: multilateral unit labor ccsta. t-statistics in
parentheses. All regressions include year and country dummies.
Tax rate in columns(1)and (2): direct taxation plus social security
taxes paid by employees divided by GD?. Tax rate in columns (3)
and (4); direct taxation plus social security taxes paid by employees
and employers plus payroll taxes divided by GD?.
36Table 9:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
65-9065-8065-80 65-80
TFP -.43 -.52 -.52 -.52
(-3.80) (-3.56) (-3.53) (-3.48)
IiVCTAX*11 .11 .29 .21 .24
(.56)(1.17)(.79) (.90)
INCTAX*12 .31 .42 .54 .74
(1.77)(2.05)(2.16). (2.44)
INCTAX*13-.24 -.22 -.35 -.25
(-1.56)(-1.36) (.1.35)(-1.16)
TRANSFERS-.02 -.09 -.10 -.06
(-.12)(-.54)(-.61) (—.41)
CCNW .16 .09 .12 .07
(1.20)(.57)(.70) (.43)
adj.R2 .06 -11 .11 .11
NOBS 281 149 149 149
Dependentvariable: multilateral unit laborcosts.t-statistics in
parentheses. All regressions include country and year dummies.
Tax rate in columns (1) and (2): direct taxation divided by total
wages and salaries. Tax rate in column (3): direct taxation plus
social security taxes paid by employees divided by total wages and
salaries.Taxrate in column (4): direct taxation plus social security
taxes paidby employees and employers plus payroll taxes,divided
bytotal wages andsalaries.
37Table 10:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
65-9065-9065-90 65-90
TEP -.21 -.20 -.20 -.20
(-5.16)(-5.22) (-4.97) (-4.94)
INCTAX *11 .16 .16 .11 .10
(2.23)(2.26)(1.32) (1.27)
IaVCTAX *12 .21 .21 .19 .18
(2.44)(2.53)(2.14) (1.80)
INCTAX• 13 .19 .18 .10 .02
(2.06)(2.10)(.77) (.20)
TRANSFERS-.02 -.03
(-.34) (-.50)
CCNW .01 .06
(.17) (1.06)
!NFL .003 .004
(.49) (.57)
adj.R2 .30 .30 .28 .26
NODS 243 243 243 243
Dependentvariable: relative price of nontradables. t-atatistica in
parentheses.Taxrate incolumns(1) and (2): direct taxation
plus social security taxes paid by employeesandemployers plus
payroll taxes, divided by GDP. Tax rate in columns (3) and (4):
direct taxation plus social security taxes paid by employees and
employers plus payrofl taxes, divided by total wages and salaries.
38Table 11:
Indices of centralization
Caimfors-Driflill Cameron
1Norway 1Sweden
2Sweden 2Norway
3Denmark 3Belgium
4Finland 4Finland
5Germany 5Denmark
6Netherlands 6Netherlands
7Belgium 7Germany
8Australia 8U.K.
9France 9Australia
10 Ui'. 10 Italy
11Italy 11 Canada
12 Japan 12 U.s.
13 U.S. 13 France
14Canada 14 Japan
Higher values of the indices indicate more de-
centralized wage setting processes.
39Appendix.
In this Appendix we develop more fully the model sketched out in sections 2, 3 and 4. We
first describethe full solutionto the case presented in section 3, which assumes J =2,i.e.
one union in each of the exportable and non-tradable sectors.
The union in the exportable sector maximizes the expected utility of its members, (3),
subject to the aggregate demand fot labor in the same sector. To derive this function,
consider first the demand for the output of the i-ft domestic firm in the exportable sector.
D(i) = (A.!)
Exactly like the typical foreign firm in the tradables sector, the representative domestic
firm in the exportable sector maximizes profits by setting the wage as a constant mark-up
over the wage: p(z) =ow/fr — 1).The derived demand for labor by the representative
firm can then be obtained by substituting this expression for its output price in (A.!),
and by recalling that according to the production function output is equal to employment:
D(i) =n(i).The derived demand for labor by the i-th firm is therefore:
E_____ (A.2)
Note that, because the firm takes E and all other prices as given, its derived demand for
labor has elasticity a, the same as its output demand. This is an obviousconsequence of
the fact that the production function has constant returns to scale in the only factor, labor,
and the wage is a constant proportion of the output price
The aggregate derived demand for labor in the exportable sector can be obtained by
integrating the expression for the demand for labor in the representative firm, eq. (A.2),
over all the firms in that sector, and by recalling that in a symmetric equilibrium all firms
set the same output price:
p =aw:l (A.3)
Thus, the aggregate demand for labor facing the union in the exportable sector is
= (A.4)
40where pandParefunctionsof w through the price formula (A.3) and the price index (2).
Using (A.3) and (2), one can write (A.4) as a function of the wage in the exportable
sector only:
=
(f_' +(e)
(A.5)
The union maximizes (3) subject to (A.5). The solution to the problem of the union is:
w(l— t)= R
— (A.6)
where e is the elasticity of the aggregate demand for labor to the wage as perceived by the
union (i.e., taking the aggregate expenditure on tradables E as given), and7 is the elasticity
of the price index for tradables, P, to the wage in the exportable sector (or equivalently to
the price in the same sector):
=
1
=pi_?p
>U (A.7)
Two observations are crucial for an intuitive understanding of (A.6). The first was
emphasized in section 3: if y were 0 the union would be charging the markup c/fr— 1)
times the "cost" of producing labor The term Fcapturesthe fact that an increase in wages
increases the general price level and therefore reduces the real wages of union members.
This effect leads to a moderation of wage demands.
The second observation is that c, the elasticity of the aggregate demand for labor, is
less than a, the elasticity of the firm's labor demand. The intuition is straightforward. An
increase in the price of a single exportable good induces substitution within the exportable
sector (i.e. towards other exportables) and towardtheimportable sector (i.e. towards all
importables). This substitution occurs with an elasticity a, which is also the elasticity of
the firm's demand for labor. On the other hand, because the union sets a uniform wage
for all firms in the sector, when the wage in that sector increases all prices of exportables
increase in the same proportion. Consequently, the intra-sectoral substitution is eliminated,
and only the substitution towards importables remains. More formally, from (A.5), c can
be written as:
(A.8)
41This expression can be interpreted by looking at the expression for the demand for labor
(A.4). As discussed above, an increase in whastwo effects on labor demand. First, it causes
a fall in the aggregate real demand for exportables E/P by increasing p and therefore
the price index of tradables P. Second, it causes substitution towards importables, by
increasing the relative price of exportables, as captured by the term p°/P'. Now suppose
there are no importables: then the price index of tradables P would be equal to the price
of exportables p (see (2)), and would be identically equal to 1. From (A.8), the elasticity
of the demandforlabor in the exportable sector to the wage would be equal to 1. This is
obvious by looking at (A.4): when wand therefore p increase in the exportable sector, there
is no substitution to foreign competitors. The only effect on the demand for exportabies
and therefore on employment comes from the fact that given the nominalamountallocated
to exportables, E, the real demand for exportables falls in proportion to the increase in the
price p.
Conversely, consider the other extreme case and suppose the mass of producers of ex-
portables tends to 0: for exposiLty purposes only, assume there is just one domestic
producer of exportables. Then the price index for tradables would consist only of importa-
bles, aside from the single exportable good. The elasticity of the price of tradables to the
price of exportables, 7,wouldbe 0, and from (A.8) the elasticity of the demand for labor
in the exportable sector would be a. Again, this can easily be interpreted by reference to
the expression for the demand for labor (A.4). When the wage in the exportable sector
increases the price of the exportable good increases in proportion, but the prices of all
competitors .theimportable goods -remainconstant. Since the only domestic producer
has mass 0, the real demand for tradables E/P does not change. AU the effect of the
increase in the wage now comes from the substitution towards importables, represented by
the term p0/Pt, whose elasticity to p and therefore wisclearly a.
We now show that the wage in the nontradable sector is hogher than in the tradable
sector, As we showed in section 3, in the nontradable sector the wage set by the union is:
th(l— t)= 21? (AS)
On the one hand, the lower elasticity of labor demand in the nontradables sector induces
42the union there to set a higher wage than in the exportable sector. On the other hand, the
elasticity of the price index for non-tradables P to the wage is higher than the corresponding
elasticity in the exportable sector. Hence, the elasticity of the price level P to thewage
is also higher in the nontradable sector. This second effect works toward restrainingwage
demands more in the nontradables sector.
However, it is easy to show that the first effect prevails if the elasticity of substitution
between goods is sufficiently high (a >2).In fact, under this condition the right hand side
of (A.6) is an increasing function of y (recall that c is a decreasing function of y); since
-y for any value of w or iii,necessarilyiii>w.The intuition runs as follows: contrary
to the exportable sector, in the nontradables sector it is not possible to substitute towards
a whole class of goods (importables). When the elasticity of substitution between goods is
sufficiently high (a >2)this fact has a larger impact on the behavior of the union in the
nontradables sector than the fact that the elasticity of the price level to thewage is higher
than in the exportable sector.
We can now prove Proposition 1 in section 3:
Proof of Proposition 1:
From eq. (A.6) and (A.3) one obtains, in a symmetric equilibrium:
—caPIa—(c—l)
(Alo a—11—t
Similarly, in the nontradables sector one obtains
(A.11)
Denoting the terms in brackets on the r.h.s. of (A.1O) by H, one can write:
dlogp =dl09P
—dlog(1 — t) +dj,oshidj,o9idloSP (A.12)
dlogfi =dlogP—dlog(1—t) (A.13)
where
d19P =d1ogP+ dlogft dIogP =dIogp (A.14)
43Combining all these expressions, one obtains:
dlogfi dlogp
diog(I —t)= _2+idIog(1—i)
(A.15)
and
dlogp—dlogj3 d1ogHdlog
'
A16
dlog(l— t)
—
dlog(1
—t) dlog7 dlogp
Nowdenote the term in brackets in (A.16) as X:sincedlogH/dlogy is positive for a >2
and dlog7/dlogp is negative, X >I.Therefore, solving (A.15) and (A.16):
dtogp — 2 dtogyi —2X
(Al? dlog(l—t)X—'dlog(l—t)X—
Because < 1, dlogp/dlog(l — t) is negative, which proves paxt (i) of the proposition. In
addition, since X>1, from (A.17) dlogp/dlog(1
—t)issmallerin absolutevalue than
diogfr/dlog( I — t). A fortiori, then, the relative price of nontradables increases. in fact,
from(A.15):
dlog(P/P)—dlogj5 dIogP—d1og dlogp (A Is
dlog(I—t)
—
dlog(1 —t)
—
dlog(l —t)
—
dlog(l —t) 7dlog(1 —1)
>
Thisproves part (ii) of the Proposition.
Toprove part (iii), consider the expressions for labor demand (and therefore employ-
ment) in the two sectors in a symmetric equilibrium. Letting n and ñ denote total employ-
ment in the exportable and non-tradable sector respectively, we have:
Ep'
(A.19)
pI_U+P*
Thetradebalance equilibrium condition requires that the nominal expenditure by domes-
tic residents on importables be equal to the nominal expenditure by foreign residents on
exportables:
p —' ' A20
Tpi_o+p'°— T'°+p'
andtherefore
(A.21) -a
and since £7 is equalto(Y + Y)/2weobtain' '
(A22 2pl'°
44which yields
Ytp°
(A.23)
Because Yt and p are constant, employment in the tradable sector decreases when the
income tax rate and therefore p increases. Similarly, using (A.21) and the fact that E=
Y/2,one obtains in the nontradable sector
Y Y p'°
(A.24)
which again decreases as tandtherefore p and flincrease.Also, because increases more
than p, ii decreases more than it.o
Wenow prove Proposition 3 in section 4:
Proof of Proposition 3:
We only prove part (i); the other two parts can be proved similarly, following the proof of
Proposition 1. n turn, we prove part (i) in three parts. (i.a): we first prove that, as long
as the unions do not internalize the nominal expenditure effect, the wage in the exportable
sector increases as the number of unions decreases; (i.b): we then prove that, given the
number .1 of unions, the wage in the exportable sector is lower if the union internalizes
the nominal expenditure effect than if it does not; (i.c): finally, we show that, once the
unions start internalizing the nominal expenditure effect, the wage in the exportable sector
decreases as the number of unions decreases.
(La) We can define the elasticity of P and Ptothe wage set by a union in the exportables
and nontradables sector as a function of J, the number of unions (note that there are J/2
unions in each sector):
2p'° - 2
7jp1_c+p.1e;-v.'=y
A.2
The first order condition for the problem of the j-th union when .1 unions are present in
the economy gives1 for the exportable sector:
wj(1— t)= RX (A.26)
45where
C.;
(A.27) Ej — 1 ÷
and
(A.28)
In the nontradable sector the first order condition gives:
tk,(i— 0= Ric.; (A.29)
where
B - - (A.30) —1+ N
and
(A.31)
Using the formula for P, (2), one obtains from (A.26):
wj(l—t)
(A.32)
ILllt) -} 7LWJ mJ WJ
and from (A.29):
4u—o
, (A.33) eI I—c]WT1
ZTLWJ +11
From (A.32) and (A.33) weobtain
H B — [
c
R2xj1j]I
= 0 (A.34)
Since both Xj and k.; are increasing in yj, and the latter is decreasing in .J for any given
p, we have dR/Ui < 0. Also, given that wd/(w0 + 1) = f7j,forany given J it is clear
that UN/Ow.; c0.Therefore, Uwj/OJ is negative: as the number of unions increases, the
wage decreases. We can then use expression (A.33) to show thatis also decreasing in
J. In fact, when .1 increases yj decreases and the r.h.s. of (A.33) decreases; also, as wj
decreases, the denominator of the l.h.s. decreases. Necessarily, then, iD., must decrease as
i increases.
46(ib) .Assurnc thatthere areJ unionsin theeconomy. Consider a union that internalizes
thenominal expenditure effect. Substituting the current account equilibrium condition(13)
into the expression for the demand for labor for the j-th union (14), one obtains:
2 * p.-0 = j-—r (A.35)
Therefore, when the unions internalize the nominal expenditure effect the elasticity of the
demand for labor Uis , while as we showed above it is a — (a — I)-yjwhenthe unions do
notinternalize thesame effect. The elasticity of the price index of tradables to thewage,
yj,is the same in the two cases. Thus, in both cases the implicitexpression for the wage
in the exportable sectorina sym'.etric equilibrium is given by expression (A.30). For
anygivenwandii',the r.h.s.of(A.30) is lower when the unions internalizethenominal
expenditureeffect, because Cj is higher in that case. Because the I.h.s. is increasing in
wandthe r.h.s. is decreasing in w,forany given th the wage in the exportable sector
wis lower when theunions internalize the nominal expenditure effect. In addition iiican
also easilybeshownto belowerwhenunionsinternalize the nominal expenditureeffect:a
foriion, then, w will also belower.
(ic) To show that, onceunions internalize thenominal expenditure effect, the wagein
theexportable sector decreases asthenumber of unions in the ecànomyI decreases,note
that theelasticity ofthe demandforlaborc1is now alwaysequalto a, and is therefore
independentof J.The elasticityofthe price of exportables 7j, however, increasesasJ
decreasesforanygiven w. Therefore,forany given w the r.h.s. of (A.3O)decreases asI
decreases.Asusual,following a similar reasoning itcan be shown that uitoodecreases as
I decreases;therefore, bothinandth decreaseasI decreases.
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